Original Worms SETUP: recovered entry and bounded CD-call analysis

2026-11-13. NO_NATIVE_RESULT. The original missing entry is recovered and hash-verified. It enters ordinary real-mode Watcom startup and application main, without an intervening unpacker. The demonstrated device operation is generic INT21/AX=4400h handle classification. The only literal INT2F is a generic runtime table entry; its concrete direct wrapper callers select INT10, INT16 and INT21. No original MSCDEX request, device pointer, version or audio dependency is proved. Installation, DOS4GW, protected WRMS execution, gameplay and audio remain OPEN.

This extends the previous retained-prefix analysis and uses the complete-CD intake. Publisher authenticity remains unverified: matching the independently streamed candidate establishes pinned byte identity, not an authenticated publisher pressing.

Exact recovery

Evidence: scratch/runs/20261113-worms-setup-entry-1600/. No production edits. The prior complete-CD manifest.json is pinned by SHA-256 ab192a904b8e37d898b679405ac3103481b9a67ace676b3fe561264b4c4dcec0. It identifies SETUP.EXE;1, extent 169, 39,746 bytes, complete-member SHA-256 92805b6402fb28b8b6d07e57038ce97d9939fd6febbdb9c5c7dde639c62b0771. The original candidate BIN is https://archive.org/download/worms_team17/CDWORMS.bin, 578,432,064 bytes, complete-disc SHA-256 e353ccf735d26f2c56d87614ab26f700f2ee5dfb79dd1848c18208276ff5d888 (inherited full-stream verification, not rehashed here).

The actual track contract is track 1 MODE1/2352, INDEX01 at BIN sector zero. Read only raw sectors 169–188, inclusive: HTTP Range bytes=397488-444527. Each successful response must be 206, Content-Range bytes 397488-444527/578432064, Content-Length 47,040, identity encoding, and an exactly sized body. Check every sector's sync and mode=1; extract bytes [16,2064) per 2,352-byte sector, concatenate and truncate to 39,746. The full member hash must match before any disassembly. The five small successful analysis passes each fetched this same range (235,200 aggregate raw bytes); there were no failed/denied-access retries, unrelated sectors or alternate media. Raw-range SHA-256 on all five passes: 8f794f28eda6d206a510ff9ebc71af4cd22e60776f5d5f33d464d844cd5d9f86. Each receipt retains status, final redirected URL, headers, lengths and hashes.

Original bytes existed only in Python memory and short-lived Linux memfds for static objdump. No disc/member file was written to /home or elsewhere. Processes exited normally; memfds close in finally. Only 6,094 unique load-image bytes in selected windows, the MZ header, compact listings and analysis receipts remain.

Entry, relocation and instruction context

Let S be the DOS MZ load segment. Addresses below are load-image offsets; add 50h for file offsets. The header declares 78 pages, last page 322 bytes, five header paragraphs, 12 relocation records at file 20h, CS:IP=0000:26B2, SS:SP=0A64:0A00 and minimum allocation 0155h paragraphs. Declared size is exactly 39,746 bytes: no appended overlay is needed for this entry path. Every relocation word is within the declared image; header/records are retained in header.json. This is MZ real-mode code, not a PE/LE or a flat 32-bit decode.

Image offset (file = image + 50h) Original instruction/context
26B2 (file 2702) e9 a6 00: JMP 275B. Bytes 26B5–275A contain runtime text/data; they are not a fall-through instruction stream.
275B fb b9 d2 08 8e c1: STI; CX=08D2h before relocation; ES=CX. Relocation at 275D makes ES=S+08D2h. Startup later sets SS and DS to this relocated data segment.
2860, 28B2 Relocated DX=08D2h reloads DS. Data offset d corresponds to image 8D20h+d, not image d. SETUP.CFG at DS:03BE is image 90DE, file 912E.
2872–287A DI=0DD2h, CX=191Ah−DI, AL=0, REP STOSB: BSS clearing in ES, not decompression. Initialized data ends at image 9AF2; zeroing starts there.
28AA → 692C AX=00FFh runs Watcom initialization records at DS:0DA2–0DC6 (image 9AC2–9AE6), six-byte records. The priority-1, type-0 near record calls 24B0 in CS=S via 691C. DOS relocates the trailing segment word at 9AC6, but this near dispatch does not consume it; type 1 would take the separate far-call branch at 6913. This resolves an actual startup callback instead of ignoring it.
28AD → 68C0 → 68CE → 0014 Ordinary direct calls enter installer application main at 0014 (file 0064). Main opens SETUP.CFG through the stream library at 0059; no unpack/next-entry gap precedes this application code.
0064 → 0409 → 0428 → 2450 → 245A First drive-space request uses BX=3, AX=BX; callee copies AX to DX and sets AH=36h before INT21. Thus DL=3 for the first request. Returned fields go to the caller's stack buffer. This is DOS drive-space probing, not an MSCDEX inquiry.

There is real lazy code patching, which must not be mistaken for packing or ordinary inline instructions. Initializer 24B0 selects FP handlers according to the FPU/control state; 2478 gets/sets vectors 34h through 3Dh using INT21/AH=35h/25h. On its hardware branch, handler 255A reads the interrupt's saved CS:IP, adds A4h to the preceding vector byte, overwrites CD with 9Bh, and rewinds saved IP by two. Handler 259E similarly writes 9b 90 for 3Dh. The alternate software handler starts at 3EAA and parses inline operands; its complete arithmetic dispatch is not proved by the hardware-branch model.

For example, image 043A cd 37 46 fa becomes 9b db 46 fa (FWAIT; FILD dword [BP−6]), next original instruction 043E. Image 0468 cd 39 56 ea consumes four bytes; 046C cd 38 1e 50 05 consumes five, then execution reaches FSTSW at 0471. A linear decode's far JMP at 046B starts inside these operands and is false evidence. cfg.json retains original bytes and derived boundaries separately. No patched executable was run or saved.

Interrupt and IOCTL callers

Original path Registers and evidence
Main 0255 → 1E6F → 1EAA → 36E1 → 36E4 → 2D4D → 2D59 → 6A08 A conditional stream-buffer path calls the generic device classifier. 2D56 loads incoming AX from the stream's handle word at [BX+8]. At 6A0B, BX=that handle; 6A0D sets AX=4400h; 6A10 issues INT21 and tests DL bit 7. Handle number is runtime-dependent and is not invented. Full [6A08,6A24) hash: d1d0d2ca9084816ee0fb2f16a38ce907daa856ae0462023bd3038590219bcd69.
Library 2AF3/2AF6, 2B12/2B15 AX=4400h then AX=4401h, BX=SI/incoming handle; second call sets DL bit 5 and clears DH. These sites are outside the bounded entry graph; no original entry caller or CD request packet is established.
2696 → 2611 → 2652 → 6892 → 689F → 759E Register-frame adapter preserves the caller's interrupt number into BL. 75A2–75AA clears BH and calculates 7603h + 3×BL. 75E1–7602 loads AX/BX/CX/DX/SI/DI/BP/ES/DS from the supplied frame and RETF-dispatches through the stacked code target.
Calls at 1161, 117D, 153F, 155C Supplied interrupt numbers are respectively 0010h, 0016h, 0010h, 0021h. They select 7633 (INT10), 7645 (INT16), 7633, 7666 (INT21). At 1536 the frame AH is 02h (video); at 1556 it is 07h (DOS input). Caller AX=interrupt number is distinct from frame AX restored by 75E1.
Generic table 7690, file 76E0 cd 2f c3, SHA-256 2742d4966037c66d4fe05a550bf55cf1c05c332519f3789c416e5166ff3ed55a. BL=2F would select it, but no concrete caller above supplies 2F. The complete verified member has no other literal cd 2f and no literal mov ax,15xx; these scans do not exclude indirect/generated calls or computed register values.

The seven literal E8 calls to the four adapter functions match the decoded call sites exactly (literal-frame-calls.json). This cross-check does not prove that no indirect caller exists. Main's ten guarded switch tables are decoded from their actual CMP/JA/index bytes, rather than treating table words as instructions. The graph has 7,554 candidate instructions/65 INT21 sites with conditional hardware FP boundaries; the stricter graph stops at original inline FP interrupts. Calls may return and both branch successors are explored: these are static candidates, not observed execution or a proof that all paths are feasible.

The remaining precise analysis gaps are runtime call targets at 1D8E/1D92/1DA4, initializer dispatcher 68EC/6900/6913/691C, formatting callbacks such as 2F14, FP save/restore callbacks 3A1E/3C1D, and the software FP dispatch tables following 3F54/3F74. cfg.json lists every unresolved transfer. There is no remaining missing SETUP entry byte or established compressed stream; there is also no justified whole-program absence claim. A stronger CD dependency claim requires resolving these contexts or separately authorized original execution. DOS4GW's file 4152h entry and WRMS's protected LE pages remain outside this task.

Current implementation and reproducible checks

source-head.txt, source-pins.json, and relevant-uncommitted.diff identify the compared main checkout and dirty DOS source. The existing untracked MSCDEX/media helper reconstruction patches are in the prior call-path run's new-{mscdex,cdrom-media,readonly-iso}.js.patch; the hashes are pinned here. The current subset implements 1500/1505/1508/150B/150D, with real-mode/VM86 bounded buffers. It supplies no 1501 device headers, 1510 driver dispatch, version or audio success. None becomes a demonstrated installer prerequisite from this analysis. INT21/4400 handles the demonstrated generic query; 4401 remains invalid-function, with no established entry path to SETUP's library site. No fake result or driver pointer was introduced, and no 1510 dependency is assumed.

Offline checks (no network, guest, build or media needed):

python3 -B scratch/runs/20261113-worms-setup-entry-1600/check.py

checks.json records seven passing groups, including bad HTTP status/range/length/ hash receipts, malformed MZ entry/relocations, all ten switch guard/target mutants, original FP operand boundaries, and seeded INT2F opcode/caller-number mutants. Offline checks validate retained evidence and reported receipts; they cannot rehash a full member that was deliberately not retained.

For a newly authorized repeat of the same bounded member read, run:

timeout --signal=TERM --kill-after=5s 180s python3 -B -u \
  scratch/runs/20261113-worms-setup-entry-1600/recover.py --trace </dev/null

recover.py enforces the manifest pin, exact sector map, HTTP bounds and complete member hash before calling trace.py. finalize.py compacts selected evidence; new helper/document patches and seals.json preserve method and evidence hashes. Git is the source archive; no source tree or full resource was archived. Independent GNU timeout deadlines bounded each recovery process. All exited; original buffers are gone. Box ID none, state NOT_CREATED, expiry null, stop receipt not applicable. No VM/DOS guest/WASM/native/browser/game/build, box, worker or capacity operation was performed.